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This CEPS Commentary analyses the impact of the Chicago NATO Summit (May 20-21) and the 
Smart Defence agenda on the European Union’s defence policy. Will the EU follow NATO and go 
‘smart’? The authors point out that the NATO agenda provides indeed a unique chance for the EU to 
make  unprecedented  progress  on  pooling  and  sharing.  They  outline  a  three-part  road  map  to 
rationalise the EU defence market and put the Union back on track as a credible and capable security 
provider. The Commentary also stresses that complementarity between the NATO and EU agenda is 
all important to achieve long-term change.  
 
The Chicago NATO Summit (May 20-21) will not change the transatlantic Alliance. But it can 
transform the way states cooperate in multilateral defence fora, very much including the 
European Union. ‘Smart Defence’ appears as the long-awaited answer to the irksome issue of 
fairer sharing of the transatlantic security burden, aka burden-sharing. It seeks to boost the 
development of Allied (read European) military capabilities through cost-effective solutions 
by pooling and sharing (P&S) resources. Despite the new label, that idea is a rather old one, 
which however has systematically failed to turn into concrete action in NATO’s 60-year-old 
history.  
Times have changed though. Operational (the lessons from Libya), structural (austerity and 
the challenges arising from a multi-polar world) and strategic pressures (re-orientation of US 
strategic  interests  towards  the  Asia-Pacific  region)  force  European  allies  to  upgrade  and 
maintain  hard  security  capacities  without  impacting  on  wobbly  national  budgets.  True, 
geopolitical  considerations  and  protectionist  national  interests  may  continue  to  hamper 
progress in collective defence capacity-building. Nevertheless, NATO is expected to endorse 
in Chicago such a comprehensive package for defence acquisition addressing critical needs 
from air-to-air refueling to intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. The implications 
might  be long-lasting  and  lead  to  a  change  in  the  security  mind-set, if  states commit  to 
develop the agenda over time, thus going beyond the Summit’s slogan.  
The link between the Smart Defence package and the EU’s pooling and sharing will play a 
crucial role in this respect. In his May 18th op-ed in the International Herald Tribune, NATO 
Supreme Allied Commander for Transformation, St￩phane Abrial, described the EU’s P&S as 
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Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS), stressed that an integral part of the Smart 
Defence  package  should  be  close  coordination  with  the  EU  and  the  European  Defence 
Agency (EDA). As a matter of fact, NATO’s agenda has already triggered a revival of the 
debate on deeper armaments cooperation in the EU.  
EU  P&S  can  be  seen  as  a  more  integrative  and  perhaps  sophisticated  version  of  Smart 
Defence, as it relies upon the effective liberalisation of the European defence market and a 
progressive  Europeanisation  of  national  defence  budgets.  P&S  essentially  relates  to  EU 
member states’ willingness to commit to joint procurement of weapons and services, to the 
integration of force structures and to increased specialisation. Two critical junctures have 
influenced the debate on EU P&S over the past three years. First, the adoption in 2009 of EU 
two Directives simplifying procedures for moving military goods among member states and 
opening defence procurement to competition across the EU. Second, the process known as 
the “Ghent Framework” has sought to identify suitable areas for increased cooperation, such 
as R&D, acquisition, joint training and exercise facilities. The last two Ministerial Steering 
Boards  (30  November  2011  and  22  March  2012)  of  the  EDA  made  further  progress  in 
developing  the  agenda.  Speaking  to  the  European  Parliament’s  Committee  on  Foreign 
Affairs on May 3rd, EDA’s Chief Executive Claude-France Arnould was reported to say that 
the NATO Chicago Summit is “a critical milestone, but not the end of the story”, explicitly 
referring to “significant EU deliverables through EDA” as well as to P&S as a long-term 
ambition for the EU to become a more capable security provider.  
The EU needs P&S as badly as NATO needs Smart Defence. From an economic standpoint, 
returns would be significant. The financial crisis led to an average cut in EU member states’ 
military budgets by 5.7% in 2010 and by a further 3.5% in 2011. It is an axiom that severe 
fiscal discipline no longer permits deficit financing of defence investments: as Europe faces 
no imminent security threat, a rise in military spending would lack political grounds and 
easily provoke mounting public criticism. At the same time, the existing EU defence system 
is uneconomical, due to fragmentation in the demand side (e.g. member states’ governments 
establishing expenditure policy and arms acquisition in an uncoordinated manner) and in 
the  supply  side  (e.g.  the  presence  of  disaggregated  national  industries  producing 
duplications in procurement and preventing economies of scale from being exploited). The 
cost of the absence of a functional defence market, exacerbated by the financial crisis, is 
exorbitant.  Operationally,  the  EU  suffers  from  a  ‘crisis  manager’s  block’:  sidelined  and 
unable  to  deliver  during  the  Libya  crisis,  it  must  also  acknowledge  a  steep  decline  in 
peacekeeping missions under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) from 2009 
onward. Trends in the global defence industry are worrisome too. Strong economic growth 
allows  emerging  powers  to  strengthen  their  military  capabilities,  diversify  their  arms 
acquisition  policies  and  develop  domestic  military  industries  to  reduce  dependence  on 
exports. Soaring competition in the global defence market, coupled with the contraction of 
the European market due to austerity, can be the source of a loss of profits for European 
military companies and a loss of strategic room for manoeuvre for Europe. 
It  is  in  nobody’s  interest  that  European  defence  goes  ‘dumb’.  NATO’s  Smart  Defence 
package, unveiled at Chicago, provides a unique opportunity for a sea-change in defence 
cooperation, which must include an ‘EU basket’. Complementarity between the NATO and 
the EU agendas is the only way to achieve effective, long-term change.   
Drawing impetus from the Chicago spirit, a three-part road map for P&S would put the EU 
on the right track to provide a substantial contribution to regional and global security. The 
road map should rely on permanent structured cooperation to set implementable objectives 
and guidelines, but also avoid politically-sensitive issues such as the establishment of an EU 
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part involves strategic equipment. A focus on ‘best practices’ (e.g. the role of EADS in the 
aerospace sector) could produce important spillovers and create emulation effects for other 
types  of  heavy  military  equipment.  Due  to  the  EU’s  growing  contribution  to  maritime 
security  and  the  increasing  importance  of  naval  operations  within  CSDP  (cf.  Operation 
Atalanta), the application to the naval sector could be a first, flagship initiative. The second 
part deals with R&D programmes. A better division of tasks between member states (in 
charge of defining the strategic priorities, based on a revised European Security Strategy), 
the European Defence Agency (tasked with operationalising these strategic needs through 
designing R&D programmes) and the Commission (as ‘project manager’ or executor) could 
create unprecedented synergies, especially if states agree to abandon the principle of ‘juste 
retour’  (or  pure  returns).  Finally,  the  third  part  would  regulate non-strategic equipment. 
Here the Ricardian lesson of ‘mutual gains from specialisation’ could provide the EU with 
more efficient and cost-effective armies.  
Chicago will not provide NATO with a new identity or raison d’etre, nor will it put an end to 
the  squabbling  and  setbacks,  such  as  those  arising  over  burden-sharing,  that  are  deeply 
rooted in the transatlantic bond. But it can very well set a new course in multilateral defence 
cooperation. The EU ought to snatch it up.   
 
 
 